[1] One’s response to the question of what we owe Iraq will be influenced by one’s response to the Iraq war itself. Those who believe the March, 2003 invasion to be justified are more likely to understand our obligation in light of the rationale given for the invasion in the first place: not just to remove Saddam and his supposed weapons of mass destruction but to bring democracy to Iraq, turning it into a beacon of light for the whole Near East. What we now owe Iraq, in light of this purpose, is to do all we can in the closing stages of the war to retrieve at least some measure of success in accomplishing that goal. This describes the administration’s position, which has persisted in being as optimistic as possible about what can still be achieved.
[2] This kind of thinking is reflected in what we are hearing about military planning for Iraq in the years to come. According to Thomas Ricks of the Washington Post, current planning calls for some 20,000 soldiers to guarantee the security of the Iraqi government, an additional 10,000 to train and advise Iraqi military and police units, a Special Operations unit to counteract al-Qaeda, and another 10,000 for headquarters and logistical personnel to command and supply this force. One can assume that civilian contractors will also continue to play a role. White House spokesman Tony Snow has likened the long-term task of the military in Iraq to the role that U.S. forces have played in South Korea over many decades. The numbers above would mean that roughly one-third of present U.S. forces in Iraq would stay there.
[3] As one who deplored the invasion from the outset, my response to the question of what we owe Iraq is quite different because my expectations about what could be accomplished there have been so radically different. Most importantly, we owe both Iraq and ourselves the acknowledgment that the war has been a tragic mistake, and that now our responsibility is to face squarely the realities of a lost cause. If our nation does this with any measure of integrity, it will also involve a confession of guilt: We have brought devastating suffering to the people of Iraq as a result of turning their country into a battleground of warring factions whose activities we simply have no capacity to stop. Whatever good intentions the administration may have had, we have created a debacle. I realize that facing this truth would involve a demonstration of honesty and realism that could hardly be expected from the present administration, but we can hope that new leadership will bring a new integrity and sufficient courage to acknowledge the catastrophe we have inflicted on the Iraqi people. This “clearing of the deck” is the first thing we owe the Iraqis.
[4] We owe the Iraqis an orderly withdrawal of what has become an army of occupation. Difficult as it is to acknowledge, our very presence in Iraq constitutes the primary reason for the widespread mayhem now taking place. To withdraw may impress some as a sign of weakness, but in fact it would demonstrate wisdom and enhance our credibility if we moved to end a war that we cannot win. There has been much talk about the importance of not staging a hasty withdrawal lest it create a vacuum to be exploited by terrorists, creating a worse situation than we now face. In truth, it would be difficult if not impossible to execute a quick and full withdrawal even if we wanted to. On grounds of logistics alone, given the one exit route through southern Iraq to Kuwait (and highly vulnerable as it is to roadside bomb attacks), it would, according to one military official, require 3,000 large convoys some ten months to remove all the military equipment and personnel that are now in Iraq. Others have estimated a withdrawal lasting at least six to eight months; clearly, no one is moving out “overnight.”
[5] The possibility that a premature withdrawal from Iraq would doom that country to perpetual bloodshed has been a favorite argument of the administration and of those in charge of the Iraqi government. It is an appeal to fear, posing all sorts of disasters from the whole Near East sinking into chaos, to an extended Shiite-Sunni civil war that could lead to genocide, to an al-Qaeda take-over of Anbar province as a base for continuing operations throughout the Near East, etc., etc. Any number of experts on the Near East is now calling for a more measured appraisal. We owe the Iraqis and ourselves an honest assessment of what may come, recognizing that the cost of this tragic venture will continue to take its toll over many years. It is a consequence we will simply have to live with; one hopes, as well, that we will have learned an indelible lesson from it. What we do know for sure is that our leaving will remove a principal cause for the fighting now taking place, and that is the one overriding reality that we can and must change.
[6] While I’m inclined, in my darker moments, to wish for a total removal of U.S. troops and simply washing our hands of the whole mess, I realize that having created the mess we are particularly obligated to do what we can for the Iraqis to ameliorate their suffering. We owe Iraq some kind of Marshall Plan to assist in its reconstruction, if at all possible in cooperation with other countries from Europe and the Near East. I’m particularly concerned about what will happen in retaliation to the thousands of Iraqis who have had the courage to assist American forces in a variety of ways. We owe them a safe harbor.
[7] The number of troops remaining should be limited (much more limited than the numbers mentioned above), placed largely around the nation’s perimeter in strategic locations to counteract any efforts of neighboring countries who would want to take advantage of the turmoil in Iraq. This should include an intended timeline in consultation with the Iraqi government to ensure that our troops are there on a temporary basis and for a specific purpose. We owe the Iraqis a clear signal that we are not intent on maintaining bases indefinitely in their country, a matter on which there is considerable (and justified) Iraqi skepticism. A principal danger we must avoid is leaving enough troops to tempt us once again to resume full-fledged combat.
[8] We owe the Iraqis and ourselves a deep and abiding commitment to diplomatic rather than military efforts in addressing the incendiary situation in the Near East. This would involve a 180 degree turn from the direction this administration has taken, but it is all the more important to show that we recognize that neither Iraq nor the United States alone can handle this debacle, and that there is no military solution to the situation we have created. We must engage in serious discussions with Iran, Syria, and other nations of the Near East as well as the European countries whom we have largely alienated. One of the most horrendous results of the war has been the millions of refugees it has created, most of whom are in Syria and Jordan but many more who are displaced within Iraq. We owe the Iraqis our best efforts, both in receiving refugees ourselves and in working with other countries in an effort to resettle and assimilate these victims of the war.
[9] I cannot conclude without reference to the larger international scene that we face as a nation in the wake of this war. No matter how unimaginable it would have been just a few decades ago, the dominant international threat we now face is a world seriously polarized by opposing religious beliefs. Christians and Muslims throughout the world should feel an overriding obligation to build bridges of understanding and respect between their nations, countering those fundamentalist segments on both sides who expect and want an Armageddon. The truth we can and must affirm is that despite our differing traditions, we are all children of God and owe to each other the respect that this conviction inspires. We face a monumental task that should turn us all into political activists on behalf of peace: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God” (Matthew 5:9).
© August 2007
Journal of Lutheran Ethics (JLE)
Volume 7, Issue 8
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