Issues and Advocacy – Sudan

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"Let my people Choose"

The Statement of the Sudanese Churches on the Right of Self Determination or Southern Sudan and the Marginalized Areas

Introduction:
The right of the people of Southern Sudan to self-determination has been and still is widely accepted by all the Sudanese political forces. Indeed, in a country famous for absence of a national consensus on the fundamentals of nation and state building, the Sudanese political forces have achieved a consensus on the Right for Self Determination (herein after abbreviated as RSD). It is not only a regionally and internationally recognized human right. It is the Right of all people to freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development. It is the right of people to govern themselves in a manner freely chosen by them. It is also an effective facility for conflict resolution, particularly in those countries, which have experienced prolonged conflict, and suffering, and no any prospects of a military victory for any of the parties. In such a situation, once parties to the conflict accept and apply it and abide by its outcome, war usually comes to an end. 

Under traditional International law, the RSD was generally seen as a desalinization facility. It was also seen as applicable to situations of ending racism, e.g. in South Africa and Namibia It was generally not applicable to what could be described as "internal colonialism" in a formally independent state. It has been argued that conditions for internal colonialism arise when one racial or cultural group dominates other groups using its control of power and resources of the formally independent state.

In the sixties to mid seventies the UN extended the RSD to non-colonial situations. Accordingly common article 2 of the Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, affirmed the RSD for people in general without confining it to desalinization context. In. Africa, the principle of Uti possidetis (the retention of pre-independence borders drawn by the colonialists) was effectively used to oppose claims of the RSD by oppressed groups struggling for independence from independent states. But the Eritrea example suggests that under certain conditions that principle could be ignored. Importantly, experiences of successor states to the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia and consensual separation of Slovakia and Czech Republic suggest that there are conditions under which independent statehood could be attained without sanctions from international law.

In the case of the Sudan, we may refer to constitutional Self-Determination. This is a process of Self-Determination based on the consensus of the people, the political forces and the government of the day. It is argued here that such consensus exist and it is evidenced by a number of documents and Covenants signed by the parties to the conflict and by public declarations of the representatives of the political forces. Where such a consensus exists, the important question is to ensure the implementation of this consensus. In case of any demonstrable delay in the implementation, the task is to ascertain the reasons for such a delay and encourage the parties to scrupulously abide by their undertakings. 

Arguments as to "who is the self' in the Sudan and "that the exercise of RSD will lead to separation" need not detain us here. They have been raised before. They also have been answered. What needs to be confronted now is: given the consensus by the Sudanese political forces on RSD, what should be done to implement it? Does the delay in implementation of this consensus suggest lack of seriousness on the part of the signatories? If so, what should be done by the ecumenical family and
international community to convince all the signatories that a scrupulous implementation of RSD for the people of the southern Sudan and other marginalized people is the only recipe for justice and peace in the Sudan?

Background to RSD
The Sudanese as a people were supposed to exercise the RSD in a plebiscite under the Cairo Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953. It was not to be. Instead of a countrywide plebiscite, the parliament in Khartoum voted in December 1955 to request the Condominium powers (Britain and
Egypt) to recognize the Sudan as an independent state effective from January 1" 1956. The Southern Sudanese representatives voted for the independence motion on the understanding that the south will have a federal status in the post independent Sudan. That understanding was based on a special motion in the parliament, which according to Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub, two times Prime Minister of the Sudan, was passed to "please the southerners". The motion prepared by prominent northern Sudanese members of parliament including Mahjoub himself, promised to consider federal status for the South. It was admittedly not meant to be honored. Self-determination vote of 1955 was obtained by fraud and therefore not biding on the southern Sudanese.

During the first armed resistance (1955-1972), the South presented its claim to exercise the RSD in the Round Table Conference (RTC) 1965. The northern political parties rejected that claim. The southern Sudanese parties then presented confederal scheme as a minimum acceptable position. The northern Sudanese parties ended up conceding a restricted local autonomy for the South in which the central government would still retain considerable powers over the police, security, finance, appointments of the chief executive and judiciary in the South. Importantly, the South was to be governed as three separate regions. 

The northern Sudanese scheme was predictably rejected by the southern Sudanese parties. However, when the May regime under Nimeri in subsequent negotiations conceded those points raised by the South, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) accepted the Addis Ababa
Agreement of 1972. Under this Agreement, the South won significant powers of self-government. However northern Sudanese traditional forces combined with Nimeri's opportunism dismantled the regional self-rule for the South in June 1983.

The SPLM/A, which launched its struggle in mid 1983, stated its objectives then as "the destruction of the old Sudan, and the creation of a New, just, democratic united Sudan". This mission statement did not mean that the Southerners had renounced their right to self-determination. This must be emphasized since the SPLM/A did not see itself as merely a southern Sudanese movement, but a movement for the whole Sudan. It was therefore left for southerner Sudanese to articulate claims that were specifically southern. Accordingly, when the National Islamic Front (NIF) seized power in June 1989, and adopted an Islamic fundamentalist program, which threatened to negate most of what the South stood for, the stage was set for decisive choice for the South. Little wonder that the RSD for the southerners was re-asserted by the southerners in the government convened National Dialogue Conference of September-October 1989 in Khartoum. With the intensification of oppression, and with the launching of Jihad against the southerners, the Nuba and the people southern Blue Nile, the demand for self-determination gathered popularity. It was therefore after the
southern Sudanese in the government controlled areas who led the demand for self-determination.

Mounting consensus over RSD
Claiming the RSD is one thing, and an important thing at that. However working for the RSD in a systematic, programmatic and consistent manner is quite another. The South is today called upon to pursue the latter course-i.e. Working for the RSD in a systematic, programmatic and consistent manner. A strategy for self-determination in form of a Vision, Mission and Program is therefore called for. The strategy would consist of the following:

1. Public Awareness. Deepening of public awareness among southerners in the Sudan and in diaspora about self-determination. This means the development of civic education program about this theme and related themes such as human rights, rule of law, humanitarian principles, good governance, democracy etc. This public awareness would include matters such as the distinction between RSD and separation, federation, free,  fair and internationally supervised referendum.

2. Such educational program may be carried out by the civil society organizations in which the Churches, youth, women groups and professional organizations play their roles.

3. Lobby for an early enactment of a referendum law that would ensure the following:
   a. Fair, free and internationally supervised referendum 
   b. Clearly defined options, which would include independent statehood.
   Needless to add that the referendum law must be a part of the interim arrangements, which shall be put in place.

4. Dialogue with all political forces and personalities in support for holding of a free, fair and internationally supervised referendum before the expiration of a fixed interim period.

5. Churches to develop a comprehensive program for securing regional and international support for RSD.

6. Call on WCC to lobby at the UN and members of the Security Council, African Union (AU) and other regional bodies such as the Arab League, European Union, Organization of Islamic States, etc for their support for RSD.

7. Promotion of peace-making and conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution capacities of civil society organizations and civil authority to ensure that the southerners are capable of maintaining peace and stability by themselves.

8. The church should work with the civil society and civil authority to promote good governance in which justice and human rights are respected

All the above are designed to bring a state of affairs that convinces the people, partners and observers that the southerners are capable of running their affairs by themselves.

Basis for peace making through self-determination process: While the Sudanese Churches support the IGAD sponsored mediation, based on the DoPs, it is hereby stressed that mediators hold the parties to bilateral or multi lateral covenants they have sealed.

To date, the Sudanese political forces have signed a number of agreements or declarations affirming their commitment to the RSD for the people of southern Sudan and other marginalized people. These are:

1. Frankfurt Agreement between the Nasir faction at that time and GoS (Government of the Sudan) agreeing on Self determination for the southern Sudanese (1992);

2. Nairobi Declaration of March 1993, between NDA parties agreeing that the basic human rights norms, including the RSD, be the basis of the future constitution of the Sudan;

3. Washington Declaration, October 1993 between SPLMIA (Dr. John Garang) and SPLMIA-United (Dr. Riak Machar) agreeing on the RSD for the southern Sudanese;

4. IGAD Declaration of Principles (DoP) of 1994, affirming the RSD for the south and conditional RSD for all the people of the Sudan; 

5. Chukudum Agreement (December 1994) between SPLM/A and the UMNIA Party agreeing on the RSD for the people of the southern Sudan including Abyei;

6. Asmara Agreement of December 1994 between NDA parties affirming the RSD for the people of the South;

7. Asmara Agreement by (NDA) June 1995, affirming the RSD choosing between federation-confederation on one hand and independence of the southern Sudan on the other. Further more internal accommodation for the people of the Nuba mountains and southern Blue Nile was to be under taken and if that failed these people would be entitled to the RSD;

8. The Khartoum Peace Agreement April 1997 between United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) led by Dr. Riak Machar on one hand and the GoS on the other, agreeing to the RSD through a referendum to be held in the year 2002;

9. The Fashoda Peace Agreement of the SPLM/A-United (Dr. Lam Akol) and the GoS September 1997 agreeing the RSD for the South;

10. Djibouti National Call of 1999 between the UMMA party and the GoS recognizing the RSD for the people of southern Sudan. The call was the first agreement among northern Sudanese leaders in which they recognized the RSD for the people of the South;

11. Article 113 of the Sudan Constitution of 1998 adopts the RSD for the south with two options: of unity or secession of Southern Sudan;

12. Geneva Agreement of 2001 between the Peoples' National Congress (Dr. Hassan El Turabi) and the SPLM/A (Dr. John Garang) recognizing the RSD for the people of the southern Sudan and criticizing the GoS for back tracking from commitment to RSD; 13.Nairobi Declaration of January 2002 between Dr. John Garang (SPLM/A) and Dr. Riak Machar (SPDF) affirming the RSD for the people of southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains and southern
    Blue Nile;

From the above listed agreements the following become very clear:

1. RSD has generally been accepted as one of the ways of resolving the Sudanese conflict.

2. RSD for the people of the Southern Sudan has been generally accepted.

3. The options open to the southerners are unity and independent statehood.

The Asmara Declaration by the NDA June 1995, (# 7 above), the Khartoum Peace Agreement 1997, (#8 above) and article 113 of the Sudan Constitution 1998, (# 11 above) are categorical about the options of unity on one hand and independence of south Sudan on the other. In none
of the above listed agreements has the options been left ambiguous. At no time have the term RSD been used to mean internal self-determination, i.e. options within one united Sudan only. However, in some of the agreements  the RSD was to be exercised by the people of southern Sudan, southern Blue Nile and Nuba mountains. 

In view of the above, peace mediators may build on this consensus of the parties on RSD and develop it into a framework for bringing about a just and lasting peace. They may urge the parties and stakeholders to abide by their commitments and particularly to enact the referendum law, which should also fix a firm date for a free, fair and internationally supervised referendum, in addition to emphasizing the options from which the people are to choose. All the above should be within the context of an agreed interim period of not more than two years. It should be noted that even the DoPs themselves in point 4 declare that if the parties to the conflict can not agree on internal arrangements based on seven elements in point 3, then each people would be entitled to exercise the right of self-determination. In other words, there is no dead lock as such under the IGAD process. If no agreement is reached, in which there is settlement in one Sudan, then this lack of agreement itself triggers the process of self-determination, not only for the South but for any
other people too.

Conclusion
The Sudanese Churches firmly believe that the conflict in the Sudan is principally about justice. The struggle is against injustice and it is about providing justice for all irrespective of creed, color, belief, and race. It is therefore not about the unity of the country. Because in a country where justice prevails, there will be no incentive or reason for separation or fragmentation. It is injustice that breaks up families, tribes and countries.

In the course of maintaining the unity of the Sudan and the struggle for justice, the oppressed people have paid dearly. To date, over 2.9 million people from these marginalized areas have lost their lives; over 4 million displaced; thousands of people maimed and wounded; millions widowed and orphaned; besides the opportunity cost of the war in terms of education, services and development is beyond quantification. Enough is enough.

It is time that the international opinion and the people of good will and above all the ecumenical family, should see to it that this suffering comes to an end. It must end in peace with justice. Our
suffering people should therefore be allowed to freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. We believe that no body is wise or knowledgeable enough to make choices for them. The elite on previous occasions had concluded
Agreements on their behalf. Systems have been imposed on them but they have not lasted. Attempts are being made to prescribe certain choices for them and we believe that such prescriptions are not the correct recipes for a just and lasting peace. It is therefore time that the IGAD committee on the Sudan and the IGAD Partners Forum press for the oppressed people to freely choose their destiny and for the political forces in the Sudan and the international community to abide by the outcome of such a choice what ever it might be. 

Signed:
His Grace Archbishop Paulino Lukudu, President Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference

His Grace Archbishop Joseph Marona, Primate Episcopal Church of the Sudan

Rev. Peter Makuac Nyak, Associate Moderator Presbyterian Church of the Sudan

Red. Taban Elonai Ari, Chairman SCC Chairman NSCC

Fr.Mark Kumbonyaki
London, 6th March 2002

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